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I. INTRODUCTION
Decision-making is a complex process involving individual
personality, current circumstances, previous experiences and
prognosticative talent. Management decision-making is an
area in which knowledge of the interaction of these components
of decision-making is of great importance. Too little is
known about these interactions. Despite this inadequacy,
management decisions still must be made. A primary purpose
of Management Information Systems (MIS) is to aid in manage-
ment decision processes. A basic premise of this thesis is
that the majority of information systems have been very unsuc-
cessful in accomplishing this goal.
A. OBJECTIVE
The objective of this thesis is to improve management
decision-making through better understanding of the contribu-
tions of information systems and also of the management
decision process itself. This objective will be pursued by
considering two sub-objectives: 1) the identification of
overt problems stemming from basic personality differences
between managers and information specialists and 2) the iden-
tification of covert problems stemming from the confusion
between intuition and insight and the use of intuition instead
of insight as a base for management decision-making.

B. SCOPE
The objectives will be pursued by exploration into the
following areas:
1. The environment of the manager; his responsibilities,
the resources at his disposal, and his needs in performing
his duties.
2. The distinctions between science and management; the
philosophical approaches, personality traits and knowledge
requirements for the performance of duties by persons in each
of the disciplines.
3. The definition of Management Information Systems; the
contributions to the manager of these systems, particularly
with regards to insight.

II. THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE MANAGER
Usual descriptions of a work environment stress the
resources available, commonly referred to as the 3M's, men,
machines, and materials. This description ignores the exter-
nal environment and gives a false sense of stability. The
actual world of the manager is highly volatile, and it is the
constant need for change which requires decision-makers.
The external environment includes natural situations,
such as location, with the associated variations in weather;
terrain and the availability of transportation; population
distribution, with the associated variations in employment
skills; purchasing preferences, leisure activity preferences;
and the political and social mores. There is also the competi-
tive situation with the associated distributions of markets
and competitor's facilities. Further, there are restrictive
situations with governmental regulations reflecting the polit-
ical and social attitudes. Most of the external environment
is beyond the control of the manager; in fact it is usually
difficult even to attempt to predict any changes.
These external conditions obviously impact on the internal
environment. Such things as Union and Government regulations
influence the employment of the workers, the types of machin-
ery employed, and the flow and use of material. To attempt
to cope with this environment, there are resources and
specialized talents available. To deal with money, there are
financial experts. For personnel natters, there are behavioral

scientists. For natural phenomena, there are appropriate
engineers. For natural resources, there are mining and
logging engineers and natural scientists. For manufactured
goods, there are production specialists and marketing special-
ists. Finally, for the acquisition of knowledge, there are
academicians, scientists and inventors.
This then, is the environment of the manager. There are
projects to complete, there are resources available, both
natural and manufactured, money and people with specialized
talents; superimposed on this is an external environment which
is usually hostile to the accomplishment of the tasks. There
are two further resources that a manager must deal with, these
are information and time. The knowledge of the environment is
of no use unless this knowledge is transmitted to the manager,
and unless time is recognized and utilized correctly, the
entire operation may well become an exercise in futility.
There is one final resource— the personal attributes of the
manager. Over and above any technical expertise, there must
be the desire to deal with the conflict between the external
environment and the completion of the projects, and to coordi-
nate the resources so as to accomplish the tasks. One further
necessary attribute is the ability to recognize and anticipate
the projects which must be done rather than merely satisfying
assignments.
An important part of the environment of the modern manager
is a Management Information System. This environment is
described in section IV. The next section identifies certain
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differences between science and management in an attempt to
describe and explain interactions between the computer or
information specialists and the managers.
11

III. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SCIENCE AND MANAGEMENT
A. SCIENCE
1. What is Science ?
Before attempting to differentiate between scientists
and non-scientists, and even before attempting to define and
distinguish the attitudes and attributes of scientists, there
should be a consideration of the philosophical aspects of the
definition of science. Campbell, in What Is Science ? [4],
made the following observations:
Science is the study of those judgements concerning which
universal agreement can be obtained. . . . Difference of
opinion enters not as to subject-matter, but the conclu-
sions based on them. . . . The answer is that we are to
exclude every particular event from the subject-matter
of science. ... Science studies certain relations between
particular events.
We examine our past experience, and order it in a way that
appears to us most simple and satisfactory; we arrange it
in a manner that is dictated by nothing but our desire
that the world may be intelligible.
Thus, in this view, to engage in science requires
taking " global-views , " using the results of particular events
as spring-boards to generalizations, distinguishing experimental
anomalies from recurring events, questioning the perceptions by
our senses, all in an attempt to determine underlying causes
rather than individual results.
There is another attitude toward what science is, that
of philosophy and metaphysics. This is an attempt to answer
ultimate questions and discover universal truths. d'Abro [5]
and Duhem [7] do not view this aspect as providing much value.
To them, science is not a mere intellectual conjecture on the
12

nature of things and a search for answers to ultimate questions
It is a pragmatic development of mathematics to describe ob-
served experimental evidence.
2. Who are Scientists ?
It is difficult to understand scientists apart from the
activity of science. The cause and effect sequence is much
like the conundrum of the "chicken and the egg." Does the
studious, introverted person become a scientist, or does a
scientist acquire studiousness and introversion? In fact, are
either studiousness or introversion actual personality traits
of scientists? How much do the actions of scientists reflect
the expectations of society (including the scientific community
itself) ? Many personality traits of scientists may be the
result of feedback and self-fulfilling prophesies. Knowledge
of the stereotype of actions expected may influence the scien-
tist to act that way and thus verify and enforce society's
attitude.
Scientists are actually a diverse group of individuals
both in their approach to work and their personal habits; how-
ever, it seems that there must be something unique in the fac-
tors of heredity and environment which produces scientists.
Many studies have been conducted attempting to describe and
explain such characteristics.
Eiduson [8 ] has conducted psychological studies on a
group of scientists in order " . . . . to know if there was such
a thing as a 'scientific personality'; if scientists could be
identified by means other than the ideas they deal with . . . .
"
Her findings are summarized as follows:
13

Therefore, I feel that this material speaks for a general
model of the person who goes into a creative vocation, a
model which stems in a large part from the characteristics
displayed in mental functioning and to a lesser degree from
the psychodynamics and motivational structure of the
individual
.
Further, Eiduson's study has found some of society's
expectations are false. Among such myths she found;
Contrary to the stereotyped concept that the man of
science is very malleable, open to every new stimuli,
having a completely open mind, he is selective, discrimi-
native, and quickly recognizes what might or might not be
appropriate. ... As a group, they tend to be discrimini-
native and selective, differentiating stimuli in very
fine ways, thus making them their own, and also show the
same tendencies in their descriptive processes.
Finally, the results of Eiduson's study show "what we
see in their cognitive styles is that this is a group of men
who grew up as intellectual rebels."
To summarize Eiduson's results on thought processes,
the scientist is a puzzle solver. He attempts to bring order
out of chaos and does not like to be bound by accented proce-
dures when solving the problems.
Another facet of scientists which Eiduson attempted to
categorize was personality. Some of her important conclusions
are:
Commonality of isolation may not seem significant in
itself. What is important, however, is that such
experiences invariably led scientists to look to their
own resources for solace and amusement. ....
The scientist became then not so much a man in search of
truth as a man who is permitted, forgiven, even encouraged
and praised for making so many false statements— so long
as he did not abandon his basic value for truth. . .
.
Most scientists carve out degrees of freedom for them-
selves with marvelous ingenuity and imaginativeness.
They are few who believe that research can be stifled by
even the most adverse external conditions.
14

Eiduson's results are very revealing. The thought
processes and personalities of scientists are described in
distinct but qualitative terms. The results confirm the
tendencies in thought processes which are consistent with the
personalities of the scientists. A complete list of the
characteristics in thought processes and personality is in-
cluded as an appendix.
B . MANAGEMENT
1. What is Management ?
In contrast to the disagreement as to what is science,
as viewed by philosophers, metaphysicians, and scientists, and
further, the disagreement even among various metaphysicians
and various scientists as to a definition, there appears to be
no disagreement when an attempt is made to ascertain what is
meant by "management." This is not because there is no diver-
gence of opinion, it is because there appears to be a lack of
a clear definition. Almost all agree on what it is, whatever
it is.
As Drucker [6] states:
What management is supposed to do and how it should be
doing it are subjects which are rarely discussed. This
oversight is no accident. It reflects the absence of
both a tenable theory of business enterprise and an
adequate discipline of management.
Concentrating exclusively on production and manufacturing,
Taylor developed in 1911, the concept of "Scientific Manage-
ment." This was an optimizing, rational breakdown of the
functions of production so as to maximize output. This was
15

an engineering approach, with the worker viewed as part of the
production process. Thus , management was entirely task
oriented. In 1916, Fayol introduced the basic functions of
management.
The task orientation was still predominant. From the
viewpoint of systems theory, this would correspond to the
analyzing phase. The concepts of Taylor and Fayol still domi-
nate much of management theory. Apparently, the synthesis
aspect has not been developed sufficiently. Even the behavi-
oral school merely presents another facet of the analysis.
At present there are two main approaches to modern
management theory; the behavioral school, and the process or
functional school. There are three subcategories of the func-
tional school, the quantitative and decision schools and the
empirical school. The empirical school is considered as part
of the process theory and the quantitative and decision schools
provide measurement techniques for both of the major categories
The differences between the two schools is most easily under-
stood in terms of McGregor's Theory X and Theory Y (see Drucker
[6]) .
Other major contributors to the behavioral school in-
clude Maslow, who developed a classification called the
"hierarchy of needs"; Argyris who concluded from his studies
that, contrary to the assumptions of Theory X, mature people
resent the constrictive control of the typical business organi-
zation; Herzberg who has refined the concepts of Maslow,
McGregor, and Argyris by defining specific factors under the
16

control of management that are important in motivation. He
has defined two types of categories: "hygiene factors" and
"positive motivators."
A recent theory of management is called "contingency
management." This school proposes that the type of manage-
ment to be practiced should be determined by the specific
task and the composition of the workers involved.
While the different schools of management are holding
academic debates as to the relative mertis of each, business
must be done. As Drucker states, "the manager cannot wait till
the scientists and scholars have done their work. Nor can the
worker. The manager has to manage today."
An important function of management, frequently only
alluded to, is decision-making. The theories of the different
schools of management provide methods of analysis and differ-
ent criteria for evaluation of the benefits of various alter-
natives. The process school attempts to reduce decisions to
those optimizing production. The behavioral school concentrates
on interpersonal relations. Management, then, may be viewed
as that function which produces optimal utilization of all
resources, both animate and inanimate, considering the trade-
offs between production degradation (which is usually a short
run phenomenon) and the amount of dysfunction in the workforce
(which may last long past any particular project) . This optim-
ization is not a rigorous mathematical process, and should not
be. It depends, in essence, on the utility function of the
decision-maker. Some of the personality traits which contri-
bute to this utility function are considered next.
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2 . Who are Managers ?
A greater confusion than that between science and
scientists exists in distinguishing management and managers.
There are many theories as to who a manager is; these are
mainly normative, i.e., relating how the manager is supposed
to act. When actual characteristics are reported, they
usually include the adjective "successful," which is a very
value- judgemental modifier. This could also lead to circular
reasoning: having assumed what success is, then the charac-
teristics are chosen.
An important function of managers is described by
Drucker [6]
:
The effective decision-maker either acts or he doesn't
act. He does not take half-action. This is the one
thing that is always wrong.
Argyris [2] describes a problem area:
Unfortunately our studies so far indicate that the
majority of managers still do not know how to use the
models as the basis for creative experiments. This is
partly due to the fact that experimentation, risk taking,
and trust have been drummed out of our managerial systems.
This assures that just those men who do not enjoy experi-
menting will become managers.
Sayles has attempted, by observation and interview, to
find the actual performance of current managers. He has shown
that many of the long held concepts of management are no
longer valid. Sayles [10] relates:
From the studies of the organization produced by the
second industrial revolution, it is clear that some of
the older management myths have to be discarded in light
of the realities of the contemporary organization. ...
Management principles have been based too heavily on




Sayles has discovered that many of. the conditions
under which the manager must work actually are in direct con-
flict with desired attributes. For example, the manager is
expected to create an organization to accomplish his objec-
tives. Frequently, however, his own position, authority and
responsibilities are ill-defined. Further, the manager is
expected to display improvisation and flexibility, yet the
system which provides guidelines for his responses is usually
inflexible. Thus, the manager must continually grope and
probe for methods with which to deal with his subordinates
and, more importantly, his work environment. As Sayles states:
Only managers who can deal with uncertainty, with ambi-
guity and battles that are never won but only fought
well, can hope to succeed. The success must be measured
by the manager's managers in terms of the ability to
maintain the system as an on-going organization rather
than to achieve some abstract "victories."
The essence of management is not of heroic proportions.
Rather, most managerial behavior is mundane, and frus-
trating. As we have seen, it involves endless negotia-
tions, trades, and bargaining; and redirection of one's
own and one's subordinates' activities in the light of
the information derived from monitoring.
A manager should not be the stereotyped harried executive,
constantly inundated with critical decisions, requiring
immediate "yes-no" answers. However, this is an atmosphere
in which many persons called managers perceive themselves to
be. To function effectively, it is clear that the manager has
to be able to plan in an atmosphere of uncertainty, understand
the impact of alternatives on the internal and external environ-
ments, and most importantly, have the innate ability to realize
the time frame in which a decision must be made.
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C. EXPLICIT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MANAGEMENT AND' SCIENCE
In addition to considering some individual attributes of
science and management, certain comparisons are very instruc-
tive. Eiduson [8] states:
I chose individuals in business for this third group
not because work in business is necessarily uncreative;
the growth and development of American industry would
certainly attest to the inventiveness and creativity
there. But the business fields, unlike the creative
fields of the arts, do not state that originality and
creative talent are the most highly prized and valued
characteristics
.
Even Campbell [4] refers to some of the misunderstandings:
The practical man is apt to sneer at the theorists; but
an examination of any of his most firmly-rooted prejudices
would show at once that he himself is as much a theorist
as the purest and most academic student. ...
It is the practical man and not the student of pure
science who is guilty of relying on extravagant specu-
lation, unchecked by comparison with solid fact.
As indicated by Drucker, while the practical man or business-
man may be a victim of false theories, time may not permit
awaiting the final validation. Waiting may be more disastrous
than a wrong decision. A bad decision usually creates a sub-
optimal condition and one of man's great contributions is the
ability to perform corrective actions. However, non- action
may result in the discontinuance of some function, and once
stopped, there may not be the capability to reestablish it.
Conversely, stubborn continued use of outmoded practices
because of tradition produces great waste. The balance between
these two should be an area in which theories of management and




Argyris [3] discusses an inherent conflict:.
The position taken by scientists and philosophers of
science (is) that the underlying spirit of scientific
research is the spirit of inquiry. It is the irresistible
need to explore the hypothetical spirit. The norm to be
open to experiments is also crucial in the spirit of the
inquiry. If we compare these conditions with those found
in the living systems of organizations (as described in
our models) , we find that the organizations tend to
create the opposite conditions. For example, it has been
shown that interpersonal oneness, experimentation, and
trust tend to be inhibited in organizations.
A complete list of the results of Eiduson's [8] comparisons
of scientists and businessmen is included in the appendix. A
few of the more significant areas are: (The scientist)
Seeks to depart radically in his expressions and thinking
from the usual, obvious, or hackneyed.
Interests point to the theoretical and abstract rather
than the practical.
Accepts reality but sees it in a way different from others.
Can tolerate ambiguities in the perceptual area.
Does not imitate and depend on others in thinking and action.
Is challenged by frustration and anxiety-producing
situations rather than being overwhelmed by them.
Is sensitive to his internal environment, needs, wishes,
desires.
Seems strongly self-directed and self-disciplined.
It is instructive to compare the stereotyped business
atmosphere of a pyramidal structure with reliance on standard
operating instructions and precedence with this list of person-
ality traits of scientists.
In simple terms, the difference between science and manage-
ment is that the primary purpose of science is to experiment
and explore; that of management is to produce. In line with
this, scientists are game players and system avoiders , while
managers must develop and design systems. Finally, while
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scientists may usually experiment in relative privacy, the
manager must work in public.
Given these differences in science and management, the next
stage is to examine the impact of these differences on decision-
making.
D. DIFFERENCES IN DECISION-MAKING
The problem-solving approach to scientific or managerial
decision-making is identical:
1. Isolate and define the problem.
2. Determine the alternative available inputs.
3. Process the inputs to obtain the possible outcomes
with the associated probabilities of occurrence.
4. Choose the "best" alternative.
The major decision process is actually step 4, choosing the
"best" alternative. The actual implementation of the process
is much different for each of these different disciplines.
Some of the major differences appear in:
1. The formulation of assumptions and hypotheses.
2. The degree to which the problem is well-defined.
3. The ability to discern the "disease" from the "symptoms."
4. The extent of quantitative vs. qualitative objectives.
5. The degree of knowledge of the totality of the avail-
able inputs.
6. The degree of knowledge of the process and the inter-
relationships between the inputs.




8. The degree to which standards exist to compare the
alternatives.
Typically, modern scientific problems evolve as extensions
to some previous experimental evidence. The formulation of the
assumptions and hypotheses is a rigorous process. The prob-
lem is usually well defined or at least is restricted to a
very narrow area. The problem is stated in the form of mathe-
matical relationships and experiments are performed to validate
the theoretical predictions. If the experimental results do
not match the desired results, the assumptions and hypotheses
are reviewed and possibly adjusted, and the experiments repeated,
This process is iterated until the theory and experimental evi-
dence agree or the theory is determined to be valid.
In contrast, for many managerial problems, little consider-
ation is given to identifying explicitly the underlying assump-
tions and hypotheses, and in the worst case, fuzzy forms of
tradition are used. Further, documentation of assumptions is
usually quite minimal. The problem is of broad scope with
limited knowledge of the totality of the inputs and particularly
the interactions existing between any of them. The problem may
well be stated in qualitative terms with some "what if" situ-
ations proposed. A "decision" is reached and the results
observed, but again there may be no documentation (other than
financial) of the results.
Differences also exist in the repeatability of the situa-
tions, the time usually allotted to the decision-making pro-
cess, and the types of risks involved. The essence of
23

scientific investigation is to limit the environment so as to
maximize the repeatability of any experiment.
Many scientific investigations are financed by large
agencies both' public and private. The investigators have little
contact with the funding process and in fact to do so might'
lower their scientific standing. Further, once the money is
allocated the success or failure of the project may not affect
future allocations for other projects, and not even future
employment may depend on decision end results. The primary
risk is the damage to the ego, the risk of committing to a pro-
ject or idea which fails.
In contrast, many managerial problems are caused by uncon-
trolled elements in the environment. Further, the problems do
not usually lend themselves to experimental procedures. Finally,
managerial decisions deal with the least reliable and most
unrepeatable resource, people. Even if it were possible to
control all other elements of the environment, just the passage
of time means that once stimuli have been impinged on people,
they are different and there is no way to repeat the experiment,
There is no way to get "exactly the same" people from another
group. They may be similar but obviously are not the same.
Next, all too often the "moment of decision" for management
may be just that. Due to real or imagined pressures the answer
to a business or management question traditionally has required
it be given "decisively." To do less apparently showed some
lack. The risks involved are also much different. While most
decisions do not involve physical risks, any that do would more
24

likely involve some workers and not the decision makers. The
majority of management decisions involve use of local funds
and choices of investment. If the decision is wrong, money
is lost which could result in the loss of employment for not
only some of the lower level workers but also the higher level
workers and even decision makers. Possibly the entire organi-
zation may fold following a horrendously bad decision.
One of the basic differences between scientific and mana-
gerial decisions is in the ability to assess that an answer
is "correct." Typically, a "right" managerial decision has
been designated as one which leads to a net positive outcome.
However, there is a great need to differentiate between the
solution to a problem, a decision, an action, and the outcome.
The outcome of a perfect solution, which led to a perfect
decision, which in turn, was implemented, by perfect action
may be judged as "wrong," due to uncontrollable elements in
the environment. A classic example occurred on the stockmarket
prior to the advent of computers. An investor determined that
there were certain stocks and associated time periods in which
to buy and sell "short." He contacted his broker with instruc-
tions as to which to do and when to do it. The broker placed
the orders as directed and the stocks performed as predicted.
Thus, the investor should have reaped great gains. Unfortu-
nately, the time delays in processing the orders were such
that the actual transactions were totally out of phase; and the
investor actually lost a great deal of money. There was no way
the processing time delay could be determined so that it could
25

be included in the investment strategy. Conversely, there
are innumerable examples in which a desired outcome has
occurred as the "lucky" result of a theoretically improper
process.
It is even more difficult (if not impossible) to deal with
the concept of optimality when assessing managerial decisions.
This is further compounded by difficulty in demonstrating
cause and effect. In management problems, frequently the
determination that a particular outcome is the direct (or even
indirect) result of an action is very tenuous. Thus, optimal
actions, even when viewed after the fact, are difficult to
determine. Finally, although game theory and simulations can
be performed, the actual decision is made and the resulting
actions performed in "real time" in the "real world"; and thus,
the particular problem is usually a "one-shot" situation, never
to occur again.
The preceding is a simplistic view of scientific and man-
agement decision-making. The differences are obviously not
as sharp and distinct as described. The excellent manager does
not perform so as to have all the disadvantages that were
reported. However, the differences were considered from a
worst case approach so that the problems were those confronting
the less enlightened managers. Thus, alleviations of these
problems would be aimed primarily at assisting such managers
in improving performance.
One approach to improving management decision-making is the
introduction of a Management Information System. This is dis-
cussed in chapter IV.
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IV. THE ENVIRONMENT OF A MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM
Whatever the problems involved in science or management,
or in the interactions between scientists and managers in
society or in a work environment, these problems are amplified
in the microcosm of a Management Information System (MIS)
.
A. DEFINITION OF MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM
Alexander [1] gives a general view:
A management information system may be defined as any
information system that provides a manager with inform-
ation on the activities and pertinent interrelationships
about the current status of the production/operation
system over which he has authority. From this basic
definition, the basic system objective is evident:
namely, to provide the manager with complete, accurate,
and timely information relating to the performance of
the organization.
Elliot and Wasley [9] have a more restricted definition:
(1) Management performed with the aid of automatic
data processing.
(2) A data processing system designed to provide
management with the information needed to manage
and supervise a particular agency or function.
Due to the size and complexities of most organizations, and
in an attempt to provide timely information, most systems
include the use of digital computers; this paper will assume
the use of a computer in the definition of an MIS.
B. CONTRIBUTIONS AND CONFLICTS
These definitions of MIS reveal what the contributions of
the MIS should be. However, for each area of contribution,
there currently are conflicts which arise.
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The reason for an information system is to assist in the
decision-making process. Drucker [6] describes some features
of decision-making:
Decision-making, further, is not an intellectual exercise.
It mobilizes the vision, energies, and resources of the
organization for effective action.
Strategic planning does not deal with future decisions.
It deals with the futurity of present decisions.
Decisions exist only in the present.
Sayles [10] comments:
More realistically, decision is an organizational process.
It is shaped as much by the pattern of interaction of
managers as it is by the contemplation and cognitive
processes of the individual.
A vital part of any organization, and of critical importance
to an MIS is valid information. However, there is disagreement
as to what constitutes valid. Invalid data is usually easy to
identify, as Duhem [7] relates:
As the French mathematician Betrand once said, "the age of
the captain, the number of the crew, the height of the mast
can yield no information about the position of the ship.
"
Argyris [3] observes: "valid data for an MIS would reveal
to many managers how much has been hidden all these years."
Further, there is the underlying structure of the MIS, as
Argyris reports, "an MIS, like any formal bureaucracy, is based
on the assumption that organizations are, and should continue
to be, rational." The reason for this, he observes, is:
A major assumption of information scientists is that if
"real life" situations can be adequately modeled (with
valid inputs to a computer model) , then action will be more
effective. To put it another way; more and more complex
decisions can be influenced by rational thought.
It should be noted that the striving for rationality and
for the inclusion of the workings of the informal organization
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as valid information are in serious conflict, since the informal
organization probably violates the information specialist's view
of rationality. Thus, the introduction of an MIS may initially
worsen the decision-making process. As Argyris [2] describes:
The new information science technology is usually intro-
duced by fanfare that creates unrealistic expectations
and is managed by a group of "whiz kids" who genuinely
are interested in changing bureaucracy, but who use the
system to control and direct people with even greater
precision and pressure.
This is confirmed by Drucker [6] :
When NASA first started, the scientists who dominated it
believed that controls, especially of course, computer-
based information, would run the system. They were soon
disabused.
Drucker presents another problem:
Communication and information are different and indeed
largely opposite, yet interdependent. Where communication
is perception, information is logic. As such, information
is purely formal and has no meaning.
Thus, another function of an MIS is to provide the vehicle for
the conversion of information to communication. However, as
Argyris [3] reports:
The final human impact of MIS is that it requires managers
with higher levels of intellectual and conceptual compe-
tence. They must be able to deal with the interrelationships
among the facts. Typically, this is not a skill possessed
by many executives
.
This, then, is the atmosphere in which most managers and
computer and information specialists operate either in the
development stages of an MIS, or trying to cope with an existing
one. Each is trying to provide the best decisions possible, but
in many instances they are working at cross purposes.
The importance of an effective MIS cannot be overstated,
for as Argyris [3] proposes, "develop valid management
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information technology and you rule the world." While this
statement may have been made facetiously, the grain of truth
is there. Once again the important word is "valid."
A prime consideration in the development and determination
of what information is needed for management decision-making
and the MIS is the interaction between the manager and the
computer or information specialist. The next section describes
an area vital to this communication process.
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V. THE ROLE OF INSIGHT IN DECISION-MAKING
One of the psychological aspects of decision-making requires
special emphasis and development. It is the psycho-physiological
process involved in learning and problem-solving. Many years
of research have been devoted to this subject, but as yet no
satisfactory, definitive theory has been developed. The area
most pertinent to decision-making, that of the solution to a
problem, has been the most baffling. There are some accepted
theories as to the mechanisms of the brain by which information
is stored, and some aspects of the processing and restorage.
However, there is as yet no reasonable theory for the process by
which the processed information is recalled, often involuntarily,
to solve a problem., which in many cases has long since been for-
gotten. Psychologists are attempting to correlate computer
simulation models, physiological measurements and psychological
tests to describe this mental process. One concept is that of
"satisficing. " This reflects the tendency of people to accept
as a solution anything above a given threshold and not to strive
for an optimum solution, or even take the time to determine if
optimal solutions exist. This tendency toward sub-optimization
can be associated with intuition, the quick response to a ques-
tion based primarily on immediate personal feelings. Whatever
the inherent process of human beings, the optimization usually
required in management decisions will not be obtained without
some formalized structure, and this is precisely the purpose
of the MIS. This optimization can be associated with insight,
the studied answer based on experience.
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To demonstrate the complexities involved in. decision-
making, and to highlight the difference beween intuition and
insight, the following example is given.
A. DECISION-MAKING: AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
It is an oft quoted saying among managers that a good mana-
ger is one who guesses right 51% of the time. If this is true,
could not most managers be replaced with some type of statis-
tical model? Also, management involvement in MIS and the suc-
cess of information systems in satisfying management's needs
have been almost universally unsuccessful. There is an inter-
relation between these two situations, the methods of construct-
ing statistical decision models has a large impact on the
effectiveness of the MIS.
Before addressing the preceding conditions directly, an
extreme example will be considered:
It is reported that a coin has been tossed 100 times, with
the result 99 heads and 1 tail. What can be inferred from
such information, and how will this information be used to
bet on the next toss?
The manner in which people respond to these questions de-
pends on a complex combination of education, experience and
possibly even heredity; this combination is usually called
"intuition." At one extreme would be the persons who rely
entirely on the report of the experimental evidence. Thus, for
them the odds are 9 9 to 1 and the bet on the next toss would
be unhesitantly for heads. At the other extreme would be the
persons who have learned that the tossing of a "fair" coin
represents "independent" events. Thus, from the definition of
32

"independent," the probability for the next toss does not depend
in any way on the previous tosses; further, from the definition
of "fair" the odds on any one toss are heads h, tail h. For
this group, the only relevant information is that a coin will
be tossed; the experimental evidence is totally ignored.
Most people would not be at either extreme; although they
have become accustomed to the odds on coin tossing of heads h,
tails H, they would try to modify these odds by attempting to
incorporate the results of the previous tosses. Here, too,
there would be diverse reasoning for the bet on the next toss.
If the experiment is taken as evidence of an unfair coin, the
bet would be towards heads; however, it is believed that the
coin actually is fair and the results were merely a fluke and
further that "nature" tends toward equilibrium, then the bet
would be on tails.
In this example, while the choices for the next bet are lim-
ited to a head or a tail, most people could not explain the
process responsible for their choice. Neither could they give
reasons for the odds they would give. It would be looked upon
as a gamble and a guess. Further, since nothing was at stake
in this hypothetical example, the time taken to make the choice
would be quite short and there would not be much agonizing
over a wrong guess.
If the bet were real and involved considerable sums of
money, most people would hesitate, procrastinate, demand highly
favorable odds and many would not play at all. This phenomenon
is discussed at length in statistics courses and is called
"utility," relating to the risk averseness of most people.
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Utility is an important concept as a view toward individual
attitudes toward decision-making. (See Schlaifer [11].)
There are some people who might not want to bet even in
this hypothetical case, their reason being lack of sufficient
information. These people are usually called "indecisive" or
"procrastinators . " A closer examination of the example reveals
that this is exactly the case. All that can be inferred from
the report is that the coin has at least two sides. Anything
else is a result of conjecture, supposition, and assumption.
There is nothing in the report to limit the coin to two sides.
Further, there is nothing reported as to the physical dimensions
of the coin or its symmetry, such knowledge could be used to
estimate the degree of fairness of the coin itself. Also, no
mention is made as to the mechanism used to toss the coin, this
could relate to the fairness of the outcomes, as well as the
degree of independence of the tosses. It would appear that a
prudent person would attempt to consider all such questions and
obtain as many answers as possible before replying. Further,
it would seem that such information should be requested and
required as an integral part of the report. Given any of the
desired information, an answer is no longer a guess.
A common thread actually can be found to be woven through
these diverse reactions to ostensibly the same information. It
is the processing by the human mind, which is influenced by the
totality of previous experiences. It is precisely the diver-
sity of responses from the mental processing of the information




Thus, in analyzing the responses to this simple example,
a partial answer to the question of replacing managers with
statistical models has been obtained. There is no way to model
completely the reaction of any individual to a single event,
let alone a series of events. This would apparently sound the
"death knell" to the dreams of computer scientists who envision
totally self-contained decision-making MIS.
The inability to model completely a self-contained system
does not mean that research and development of computerized
MIS and decision-making should be abandoned. No system has been
modeled "completely" or exactly. Almost all equations used in
the physical sciences are first order approximations, but this
has in no way lessened their usefulness in advancing the under-
standing of physical phenomena*. Thus, it is both egotistical
and self-defeating to reject mathematical models as a tool be-
cause the process is too complex to be modeled exactly. However,
it is also foolhardy to confuse the model with reality and
blindly accept the solution to some equations as the absolute
answer to an actual problem. In most cases, a workable answer
should exist somewhere between these two extremes.
Another part of the answer is that "intuition" usually is
not sufficient to provide an answer. Intuition provides an
immediate guess, based on very few facts. What is needed is a
careful consideration of the problem, the data, and the conse-
quences; this process results in "insight." It is the insight
gained through experiences of the decision-maker and not intui-
tion which is the major contribution of the person to the
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process. A successful manager, then, should not be one who
guesses right 51% of the time, but one who relies on guessing
the least amount of the time. Thus, insight is the process
which should be addressed by the information specialists when
attempting to develop algorithms and models of decision pro-
cesses. The distinction between "intuition" and "insight" is
of prime importance.
B. INSIGHT
Most books and articles relating the success, or more
likely, the failures in the implementation of Management
Information Systems stress two factors as most important:
1. Involvement and backing of top management; and
2. Communication between management and the computer or
information specialist.
However, in the context of this thesis, it appears that an
equivalent, if not more appropriate identification of the fac-
tors is:
1. The misunderstanding and misapplication of scientific
methods ; and
2. The basic differences in personality inherent in mana-
gers and computer scientists.
The mental process usually associated with problem-solving
and decision-making is referred to as intuition or insight.
These two words are used interchangeably as if they were equi-
valent. However, as shown in the preceding example, the two
are not identical. For the purposes of this thesis, a differ-
entiation between the two terms will be made as follows:
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intuition - the unconscious use of the subconscious
processing of information;
insight - the conscious use of the subconscious
processing of information.
The coining or defining of a word cannot in itself change
many years of traditional behavior, personality and personality
conflicts, etc. However, it appears that it is exactly the
misunderstanding between these two terms which has created part
of the problem in developing an MIS. This misunderstanding has
developed from the attempt to apply scientific methods to mana-
gerial decisions with the use of an information system.
To confuse scientific method with the equations and compu-
tations and the formal presentations is to confuse ritual with
results. It is much like the "sight reading" phenomena foisted
upon the schools by the educators. It was found that the best
readers, when tested, apparently used the "sight method"; thus,
to improve the reading level of the other students, they too,
were started with the "sight method." Thus, phonics and all
other aspects of learning to read were ignored. It was finally
discovered that the fast readers had merely accelerated the pre-
liminary phases of learning and had not skipped them. Thus,
an important aspect of learning is "when." Just as in learning
to drive an automobile, what to do is easy to learn, accelerate
or brake; when you do either is a complicated function of the
circumstances. While a theoretical algorithm might be derivable,
the vast number of different circumstances, including the reac-
tion capabilities of the drivers, precludes any attempt at quan-
titative directions. The application of "when" to the use of
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scientific method comes not in the data gathering and manipul-
ation, but in the coordination and analysis of the relation-
ships of the events. It is not the ability to write down the
ritual of problem solving and do it "by the numbers/ 1 that
should be applied to management. It is innovation, acceptance
of failure as part of the process, and serendipity—the ability
to recognize the unexpected result—which will truly aid
management. At this time, failure flies in the face of the
profit-motivated attitude of business (in fact the attitude of
the public in general) . But, again, it is the "when" of the
failure which is important. It should be during the planning
and simulation phases (these are equivalent to the experimental
phases in science) , so that the chances of failure during the
implementation phase is minimized. Thus, risk and failure are
not synonymous
.
There are two features of science, or more properly man's
knowledge of science, that are sometimes overlooked. One is
approximation, and the other is insight. It is actually the
complex combination of these two which yields the advances in
science. While analytic equations and mathematical solutions
provide an aura of precision and exactness, this is a false
impression. Duhem [7] describes the development process:
(There are) four fundamental operations in a physical theory:
(1) the definition and measure of physical magnitudes;
(2) the selection of hypotheses; (3) the mathematical develop-
ment of the theory; (4) the comparison of the theory with
experiment.
Each of these is limited in accuracy in a very interdependent
manner. The preliminary experiments and even some of the sub-
sequent ones are limited by the engineering capabilities of the
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time. Also, the mathematical solution is obtained using the
techniques available. Thus, most physical theories are first
or second order approximations. Even if the experimental
error could be completely eliminated (which is impossible)
,
problems still remain. First, the totality of interrelations
producing the physical phenomenon are never completely known
and modeled. Second, there may not exist the mathematical
techniques required to solve the more complicated formulation.
There are two outstanding examples of the approximation nature
of physics. d'Abro [5] relates:
There is no more simple law in physics than that of perfect
gases; and yet we know that this apparent simplicity is
due to our macroscopic observations and that it conceals
the most bewildering chaos and uncertainty.
Also, the equations of motion for a falling rock are approxi-
mate. They apply only to a point mass falling in a vacuum.
Once the actual physical dimensions and the air resistance are
introduced, the formulation and the solution become approximate.
Thus, progress in knowledge in science is a complex leap-
frog of improved engineering, improved analytic models, and
improved mathematical processes; all of which are still approxi-
mations, with each following from and producing innovations in
the others. The process which produces the improvements in
science is also complex. As Duhem [7] describes it:
Between the phenomena really observed in the course of
an experiment and the result formulated by the physicist,
there is interpolated a very complex intellectual elabor-
ation which substitutes for the recital of concrete facts
an abstract and symbolic judgement.
After many years of continued and continuous improvement in
a particular area, there is usually some large jump, followed
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by another period of relative continuity which fills in the
connecting data. The realization of the need for new theories
does not follow directly from preceding information, but is
not totally divorced from it. The "overnight" successes in
science usually result from a long period of consideration of
previous information and as an attempt to remove apparent
contradictions
.
This part of the progress in improvement in science can
best be classified as "insight." The importance of insight
has long been recognized by the scientific community. As Duhem
[7] relates:
When Newton was asked how he went about making a discovery,
he replied: 'I keep the subject constantly before me, and
I wait until the first glimmer begins to dawn slowly and
gradually, and changes into full daylight and clarity. 1
d'Abro relates that with respect to Einstein [5]:
It is not his knowledge of mathematics or of physics that
causes admiration, it is his insight into the philosophy
of nature which is stupendous.
However, d'Abro also cautions:
Einstein argues from the standpoint of the physicist, but
the opinions will certainly be endorsed by pure mathe-
maticians. They, more than all others, have been led to
realize how cautious we must be of the dictates of intuition
and so-called common sense.
The importance of insight, rather than intuition was also
found in the study of Eiduson [8]:
While many anecdotes of great creatives have suggested
the emergence of 'inspiration" . . . and have perpetuated
the notion that creative thinking often occurs away from
the work table, even such dramatic "break-throughs" are
shown upon closer scrutiny to occur only after periods
when concentration has been intense, where intellectual
work has been purposeful, rational, and logical. There
has usually been dogged persistence, tedious effort, and
a clinging to long-sighted goals.
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Management theorists have also recently discovered the
importance of insight, or at least the failure of intuition.
Drucker [6] has the following observations:
Creativity, if by that is meant undirected, unstructured,
untutored, and uncontrolled guessing, is not likely to
produce results. ... The best proof that creativity is
no substitute for analysis and knowledge are the experi-
ences of those enterprises which were expropriated by
governments with the professionals either expelled or
leaving. . .
.
Most managers know they need better tools. Most have
learned by bitter experience that intuition is unreliable,
if not downright treacherous, if used as the only basis
for decision. ... Complex systems actually behave
1 counter- intuitively .
'
Thus, scientists, psychologists and some management theorists
have seen the appropriateness for insight, as differentiated
from intuition, in the decision process. However, the computer
specialist dealing with most managers has perceived a prepon-
derance of the use of intuition. Since intuition usually is
not compatible with optimization, the computer scientist has
striven to formalize the entire process, and at least obtain a
mathematical optimization. Such optimization, relying totally
on algorithms rarely produces acceptable real-world results.
Thus, a commitment by top management may well obtain a compu-
terized system. As noted by Argyris [2], "Theory X managers
2
use Theory X to bring about change." However, without the
realization of the need for the inclusion of the contribution
of the insight of the manager, the result may very likely be
either little more than an automated accounting system, or,
at the other extreme, a fully automated decision system based
on totally inadequate models. Conversely, most managers will
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have to be alerted to having more information available with
which to make the decision, and attempting to follow some
systemized approach.
As to the communication problem, Drucker [6] states:
Communication presupposes common understanding and a
common language, and it is precisely that which is
usually lacking.
Research, particularly as exemplified by Eiduson [8] has
revealed that, indeed, scientists and businessmen do have
fundamentally different personalities. One basic difference
is a greater reliance on insight by the scientist and on intui-
tion by the businessman. It will take more than a Data Pro-
cessing course for managers and a Theory of Management course
for programmers, to provide a common base for understanding of
the information required to aid in managerial decision-making
and the capabilities of information systems to process that
information. The differences in personality and background
lead to misunderstandings and different interpretations of the
same words. A key word in the communication process is
"insight.
"
The vibrant environment of the manager has now been
described, together with the diversity of resources available
with which to perform the varied functions. Information sys-
tems have been shown to be simultaneously a cause for a changed
environment, a prime resource, and in some cases, a great
hinderance. This is because much of the potential contribu-
tion of the MIS has been diminished by the conflicts which have
arisen, particularly due to the differences in objectives and
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attitudes of the information specialists and the managers.
In their zeal to aid in the management decision process, the
information specialists have misapplied scientific methods.
In some instances this has occurred because the managers have
obviated their position of responsibility and control for the
system.
Finally, it has been shown that insight is the key element
in decision-making; and that it is the recognition of the
importance of insight by both managers and information special-
ists which is paramount in the development stages of MIS.
Conversely, the functioning MIS is essential to the manager in




VI. RESULTS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The original purpose of this study was to have been the
development of a pragmatic, operational procedure to improve
the participation of managers in the development of a Manage-
ment Information System, and thus, increase the contribution
of the MIS to the management decision procedures. This could
not be done to any satisfactory degree. However, since
Eiduson's study on personality differences [8] was published
in 196 2, and Argyris' article on the problems in implementing
systems [3] was published in 1970, and the problems still
remain in 1976, it is not too surprising that an explicit
solution was not obtained.
As a beginning toward a solution, two definitive problem
areas were identified and explored: 1) the communication prob-
lem caused by the inherent differences in personality between
scientists and managers, and 2) the problems caused by the
confusion of intuition for insight as a procedure for manage-
ment decision-making. The result of these two problems has
manifested itself as misapplication of scientific methods to
management.
In preparing background information necessary to place
these topics in perspective, certain ideas became apparent.
Questions regarding the philosophical basis for management
theory and application had to be resolved before any resolution
of these problems could be attempted.
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The complexity of decision-making required the use of
information from a variety of sources. The agreement between
writers in such diverse disciplines as scientific philosophy,
psychology, and psychiatry and contemporary management theory
was startling. Whether or not these consistencies were the
result of coincidence of natural agreement is almost impossible
to determine. One thing which became evident was the documen-
tation of misuse of scientific methods as applied to management
by the computer and information specialists.
Textbook expositions of scientific or mathematical theories
make it appear that the development always follows a fixed,
sequential pattern of assumption and definition, theorem and
proof. Biographical and historical reports show the true jagged,
sporadic route that is usually followed. There are many false
starts, blind alleys, then somehow a filling in of the missing
pieces. Then, and only then, does the logical sequence become
apparent. Any applicability of scientific methods has been
seriously confused by the social scientists, who declare manage-
ment problems to be too complex, individual, and unique to be
solved (exactly) by mathematical models. At the other extreme
they cannot be solved by the computer specialists, who purport
to be able to solve the problems of the ages with algorithms.
The developers of MIS, particularly the information special-
ists, may have fallen into a trap. The most practical applied
aspect of physical science is engineering. Thus, ultimately
the manager should be in the same relative position relative
to theories of management as the engineer is to natural sciences,
particularly physics. It appears that in the desire to provide
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the tools for management, rather than a parallel development
or adaptation of the scientific method, the engineering
approach was adapted directly. This would be a natural ten-
dency since both disciplines pride themselves on their practi-
cality. Thus, rather than a theory of management decision-
making, there has been in reality only an "engineering." For
this approach to work, this would presuppose that there is a
direct correlation between the theories of natural science and
the theories of management decision-making, which then allows
direct adoption of engineering techniques by managers.
The computer specialists have thus committed two errors.
First, in trying to apply scientific methods directly to man-
agement decision-making; second, in misunderstanding the scien-
tific methods they have attempted to apply. The computer
specialist is not totally to blame for the failure of MIS.
There has been the accepted tradition that management decision-
making usually has a short time frame. Thus, some optimization
computation which could be performed in the time allotted was
developed. In the name of practicality and expediency, prob-
lems were not formulated nor were solutions developed in a
consistent manner. Rather, they were usually developed by ad
hoc and at times haphazard procedures. Also, the insistence
on exactness, the confusion in computational accuracy, and the
inadequacy of the model are common failings not restricted to
developers of MIS.
The preceding problems, and a great number of the problems
with MIS are attributed to a problem in "communication." This
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thesis has attempted to show that it is an inherent difference
in personality between scientists and managers which creates
this communication gap. The study of Eiduson [8] has identified
basic differences; knowledge of these differences should allow
the information specialists and the managers to develop areas
of common understanding. Thus, the first step should be an
education of both information specialists and managers of the
results of personality tests such as Eiduson* s.
One final observation is appropriate. The list of charac-
teristics describing self-actualized persons appears to corre-
late very highly with the attributes compiled by Eiduson,
particularly those attributes which differentiated scientists
from businessmen. From this, it would appear more difficult
for the manager to perform in a self-actualized level while at
work. In fact, some attributes such as transcending the environ-
ment rather than coping with it, are in direct conflict with
major functions of a manager. Whether this is true, or whether
Maslow had an unconscious (or conscious) bias toward scientists,
thus presenting characteristics more suitable to scientists,
is a point of curiosity. If, indeed, the businessman cannot
perform in a self-actualized mode while on the job, this could









The following is a complete list of the characteristics of
the thought processes of scientists
:
(1) He seeks to depart radically in his expressions and
thinking from the usual, obvious, or hackneyed.
He displays novelty in ideational activity.
He shows an unusual emphasis in his thinking in the
elaboration of fantasy.
He shows a richness in his symbolic and descriptive
expressions and associations.
He has the capacity for recombining and reorganizing
familiar concept.
He accepts reality but sees it in a way different
from others.
His intellectual development is broad and he displays
a diversity of interests.
His interests point to the theoretical and abstract
rather than to the practical and realistic.
He prefers complex ideas and situations rather than
simple ones.
He seeks out delicate and subtle impressions and is
usually responsive to sensory experience data.
He can tolerate ambiguities and perception.
He can loosen or relax controls in thinking without
showing personality disorganization.
B. PERSONALITY
The following is a complete list of the characteristics of
the personality of scientists:
(1) The scientist has strong emotional leaning to
intellectual activity.















(3) He is challenged by frustration and ' anxiety-producing
situations.
(4) Curiosity is likely to be a major determinant in his
work.
(5) Strong ego involvement and conflict are expressed in
work.
(6) He does not use parental ideals to set up his own
goals.
(7) He shows a strong capacity for sensual gratifications.
(8) He is motivated by a desire to master or interpret
natural forces or reality.
(9) He is sensitive to the moods and feelings of others.
(10) He is sensitive to his internal environment, needs,
wishes and desires.
(11) He values work primarily as permitting expression of
inner personality.
C. TEST RESULTS
The following is a list of significant differences in
response of scientists and businessmen:
Thinking and Perception Variables
A. Items achieving a significance level of .05 or smaller
Seeks to depart radically in his expressions and
thinking from the usual, obvious, or hackneyed.
Can loosen or relax controls in thinking without
personality disorganization.
Shows richness in symbolic and descriptive expression
and association.
Interests point to the theoretical and abstract rather
than the practical and realistic.
Has capacity for recombining, reorganizing visual
conceptions
.
Displays novelty in ideational activity.
B. Items achieving a significant level of .10:
Accepts reality but sees it in a way different from
others
.
Can tolerate ambiguities in the perceptual area.




A. Items achieving a significance level of .05 or smaller:
Shows a strong tendency for sensuous gratification.
Has strong emotional leanings for intellectual
activity.
Imitates and depends on others in thinking and action
(reverse scored)
.
Is challenged by frustration and anxiety-producing
situations rather than being overwhelmed by them.
B. Items achieving a significance level of .10:
Is sensitive to the moods and feelings of others.
Is sensitive to his internal environment, needs,
wishes, desires.
Motivational Variables
A. Items achieving a significance level of .05 or smaller:
Curiosity likely to be a prominent determinant of work.
Uses parental ideals to set his own goals (reverse
scored)
.
Seems to be strongly self-directed and self-disciplined
Strong ego involvement and conflict expressed in work.
Motivated by a desire to master or interpret natural
forces or reality.
B. Items achieving a significance level of .10:
Values work primarily as permitting expression of
inner personality.
II. MASLOW
A. HIERARCHY OF NEEDS
The following is the hierarchy of needs as developed by
Mas low:
1. Physiological needs;
2. Safety, stability and security;
3. Self-esteem (ego-need) and the esteem of others;




B. CHARACTERISTICS OF SELF-ACTUALIZATION
The following is a list of characteristics of self-
actualized persons:
They are realistically oriented.
They accept themselves, or other people, and the
natural world for what they are.
They have a great deal of spontaneity.
They are problem-centered rather than self-centered.
They are autonomous
.
They have an air of detachment and a need for privacy.
Their appreciation of people and things is fresh
rather than stereotyped.
Most of them have had profound mystical and spiritual
experiences, although not necessarily religious in
character.
They identify with mankind.
Their values and attitudes are democratic.
They do not confuse means with ends.
Their sense of humor is philosophical rather than
hostile.
They have a great fund of creativeness
.
They resist conformity to the culture.




The following is a list of management myths:
1. A manager should take orders from only one man,
his boss. (Most managers, in fact, work for, i.e.,
they respond to the initiation of many people who
are customers for the services they render or who
are in a position to make demands upon them.)
2. The manager does work himself only under excep-
tional circumstances; the good manager gets all his
work done through the activities of his subordinates
(The manager himself must carry on many of the rela-
tionships with "outsiders" in order to negotiate
for the materials and services he receives and to
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participate in the procedures by which his
activities are evaluated by specialized groups
in the organization.
)
3. The manager devotes most of his time and energy
to supervising his subordinates. (The need to
interact with many groups outside his own keeps
the manager away from subordinates a significant
portion of the time.)
4. The good manager manages by looking at the results.
(The modern organization has so many interdependent
parts that the manager could not wait for results
if he wanted to; others who were being affected
would be at his door. But even without these
pressures, the costs of waiting to find out "how
things are going" until the results are seen would
be enormous. Furthermore, most "results" are
joint products and cannot be assessed against a
single individual. Consequently, methods of con-
tinuous feedback are required.)
5. To be effective, the manager must have authority
equal to his responsibility. (A manager almost
never has authority equal to his responsibility;
he must depend on the actions of many people over
whom he has not the slightest control.)
6. Staff people have no real authority since they are
subsidiary to the line organization. (Staff groups
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